And the winner is...

And the winner of the Red Teams Patch is: Morgan L.
Morgan, please send us your address.
Everyone, thanks so much!
And the winner of the Red Teams Patch is: Morgan L.
Morgan, please send us your address.
Everyone, thanks so much!
Question:
Dan and I talked about this on Episode 3 of the Red Team Podcast, but maybe this question warrants going a little deeper.
Usually a good Red Team, as we think of it, is composed of two very distinctive sub teams: the Operational Team and the Support Team.
The Operational Team usually is forward deployed. Whether performing physical reconnoissance, or open source intelligence. Whether actively trying to get into things, or on the phone working the social engineering angle. They are the people that learn the target, research the possible adversaries, and help identify the vulnerabilities and define the plan of action.
The Support Team, on the other hand, usually stays back, whether at the office listening to shells getting back, monitoring radio, providing access and intelligence to the Operational Team, and coordinating with the customer if needed.
One thing to note is that the Team Leader moves between the two sub teams, however, most often - in our case at least - he or she is on the Operational Team.
As we mentioned, the Operational Team is in charge of recon, identifying the weaknesses, and executing the plan. Members of this sub team, take different roles, based on their strengths. Though the team composition might vary with each engagement, it is a good idea to cross train each person with another, thus having redundancy.
Usually the Operational Team members include:
This sub team takes care of all the needs of the team while things are happening. They provide an extra set of eyes when needed, they perform the initial recon once a foothold on the network is gained, the execute further exploits and gain persistence on other systems, the identify more targets and generally speaking, they are in charge of connecting the dots, and the Find and Fix and Analyze on the 3FEAD.
Usually the members are:
Again, in both cases individual team members have to cross train in multiple areas of responsibility, covering for each other, and often rotating between those 2 sub teams.
A great addition to the Red Teaming world by Mark Mateski at Reciprocal Strategies.
I’m a red teamer:
- I ask questions even when the answer seems obvious.
- I speak the truth as I understand it.
- I protect my clients from their adversaries and from themselves.
Go read the entire post. It blends nicely with our own Rules of Red Teaming:
How red teaming can transform your stumbling blocks into stepping stones.
In an exclusive feature for Performance, Potts reflects on his tenure and delves into Scottish Rugby’s use of red teaming – a common training practice in the military, intelligence, aviation and politics – to explain why it may prove a valuable tool for others in the world of elite sport.
-- ACG
Since we didn't meet the minimum, the orders will not be fulfilled. Maybe next time.
One of the things that makes the security field so interesting is that it’s mostly about people. Security efforts (even if assisted by security systems) are usually directed at people, and largely executed by people for the protection of people. The most important assets are usually people, most of the highest risks we try to mitigate have to do with people and most screening and assessment efforts are attempts to distinguish between people who pose a security risk and those who do not.
If you can’t understand people, you can’t fully understand security.
This coming April 5th, we'll be recording live episode 21 of the Red Team Podcast in NYC. Starting after 1700 hours (5pm), we'll be at Harding's - 32 E 21st St, New York, NY 10010.
Come and see what's up.
This approach and way of doing things was good, however it presented a challenge. Most organizations are not ready for this kind of security assessments. Their security programs and people are not mature enough to really understand the need for Red Teaming, and they were not ready for the assessment, often resulting in wasted efforts and the fact that the Team penetrated them using techniques they never thought about.